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Rapacious Resource Depletion, Excessive 





For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural 
exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are 
transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to 
improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle 
about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of 
resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with 
many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes 
away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick 
rule. The power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, 
especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. The theory 
suggests that adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices 
over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. 
JEL-Code: E20, F32, O13, Q01, Q32. 
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1. Introduction 
The  idea  that  rents  from  exhaustible  natural  resources  should  be  saved  and  reinvested  in 
productive capital is common in policy circles. It has first been formalized by Hartwick (1977) 
within  the  context  of  the  canonical  closed  economy  model  of  resource  extraction,  capital 
formation, consumption and growth developed by Solow (1974). With Cobb-Douglas production, 
the  capital  stock  grows  at  a  linear  rate  with  the  saving  rate  equal  to  the  constant  share  of 
exhaustible  natural  resource  in  value  added,  all  rents  from  resources  are  reinvested  and 
consumption  is  sustained  at  a  constant  level.  This  way  of  transforming  exhaustible  natural 
resources into productive capital has become known as the Hartwick rule.
 2 To obtain this result, 
prices  of  natural  resources  must  grow  at  the  market  rate  of  interest  for  the  country  to  be 
indifferent between keeping natural resources in the ground or depleting them and obtaining a 
market return. This is, of course, the Hotelling rule first stated by Hotelling (1931). 
Our principle objective is to derive political counterparts of the Hartwick and Hotelling 
rules  by  extending  the  analysis  of  Solow  (1974)  and  Hartwick  (1979)  to  a  fractionalized 
economy, i.e., an economy with competing factions, each owning part of the nation’s stock of 
exhaustible natural resources. Ownership rights on the stock owned by each group are, however, 
not secure, because of seepage between different interconnected fields or reservoirs of natural 
resources.
3 Our analysis is thus concerned with non-renewable natural resources that are prone to 
seepage, such as oil, gas or water, and not with the whole range of exhaustible reserves to which 
the Hotelling rule applies .  Seepage of resources between interconnected fields or reservoirs  
introduces a dynamic common -pool problem, especially if  the rate of  seepage is  substantial. 
Effectively, competing factions extract natural resources too fast for fear of their reserves seeping 
to other fields.  However, our main focus is on how economic development leads to better 
                                                 
2 Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (1980) and Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) discuss the Hartwick rule from the 
point of view of max-min egalitarianism. However, with a positive elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
private consumption will not be constant. If consumption is initially held below its max-min level, capital is 
accumulated sufficiently fast to ensure that later generations enjoy increasing levels of consumption. While 
resource use declines to zero, unlimited growth in consumption and output is feasible. The Euler equation 
for consumption growth implies that, as long as the rate of time preference is strictly positive, the capital 
stock must ultimately go to zero to ensure that growth in private consumption is non-negative. It is thus 
optimal to let consumption, output and capital vanish in the long run even though it is feasible to avoid 
such a doomsday scenario. Future generations are thus doomed. From a utilitarian perspective this does not 
matter as the benefit to early generations exceeds the loss to later generations. Obviously, it is hard on 
ethical grounds to defend such an outcome. This is why the max-min egalitarian outcome seems preferable. 
3 Over-pumping of water out of once plentiful groundwater aquifers for irrigation purposes is one of the 
main  reasons  for  water  shortages  from  the  High  plains  of  the  United  States  to  the  Gangetic  Plain  of 
northern India to Australia (Sachs, 2008). Due to seepage and the unregulated and indiscriminate access to 
groundwater resources, much of this over-pumping arises from a classic common-pool problem. Over-
pumping causes not only water shortages, but also leads to contamination with salt water, poisoning and 
collapse of aquifers. Fish does not respect territorial waters, but is a renewable resource.    2 
property rights and thus to less infringement of property rights. The degree to which individual 
fields can be encroached by others thus decreases with economic development.  
   We  thus  offer  a  political  economy  explanation  of  why  fractionalized  resource-rich 
countries  deplete  their  natural  resources  faster  and  end  up  with  lower  levels  of  sustainable 
consumption than homogenous societies, especially if property rights are more insecure. Each one 
of the rival groups tries to deplete their natural resources before it seeps away or is grabbed by 
other groups. Since property rights for natural resources are badly defined, the power struggle 
becomes more intense and makes competing groups more impatient. As a result, the country 
depletes  natural  resources  faster  than  dictated  by  the  Hotelling  rule.  Fractionalized  countries 
substitute away from natural resources to capital in production at a too rapid rate from a social 
perspective  so  that  they  save  and  invest  more  than  a  homogenous  society.  We  show  that 
fractionalization into different resource-owning groups and less secure property rights drive the 
non-cooperative saving rate above the production share of natural resources. The interest rate and 
the  output-capital  ratio  gradually  fall  to  zero.  We  will  show  that  the  power  struggle  in  a 
fractionalized  society  with  insecure  property  rights  will  lead  to  faster  depletion  of  natural 
resources and consequently a higher saving and investment rate. This boosts output. However, 
due to the higher savings rate, a smaller proportion of output is devoted to consumption. This is 
why, despite the increase in output, fractionalization and less secure property rights depress the 
sustainable level of aggregate consumption and social welfare, especially if there are many rival 
factions and property rights are less secure. Of course, oil-rich countries do invest a substantial 
proportion of their oil revenues in human and physical capital and it is may well be that their rates 
of oil depletion and thus their rate of investment are excessively high and sustainable level of 
consumption  excessively  low  from  a  social  point  of  view.  The  recent  bursting  of  real-estate 
booms in oil-rich countries such as Kazakhstan (e.g., Kuralbayeva, van der Ploeg and Venables, 
2010) and the Gulf States seems to suggest that investment rates might have been excessive. 
We also establish that genuine saving is zero in a fractionalized society with insecure 
property rights if, following Arrow, Dasgupta and Mäler (2003), welfare-based accounting prices 
are used to value the cost of resource depletion. This accounting price corresponds to the market 
price that would prevail in a homogenous society, and is therefore higher than the market price 
that  prevails  in  a  fractionalized  society.  Zero  genuine  saving  occurs,  because  the  too  rapid 
depletion of natural resources is in line with the too rapid accumulation of physical capital by 
each group. Since the correct accounting price that must be used to calculate genuine saving 
exceeds  the  market  price,  the  cost  of  resource  depletion  is  under-estimated  if  market  prices 
instead of accounting prices are used. This suggests that true genuine saving may be even more   3 
negative than adjusted net saving estimates reported by the World Bank for many resource-rich 
countries, especially if they have a high degree of fractionalization and insecure property rights. 
Our general equilibrium analysis is related to the earlier literature on oligopoly extraction 
of a common property natural resource in partial equilibrium, which stresses the importance of 
the period of commitment and the importance of the feedback Nash and the open-loop Nash 
equilibrium solutions (e.g., Reinganum and Stokey, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1987; Karp, 1992). The 
main insight of this literature is that in a non-cooperative context groups tap the common stock of 
natural resources more quickly, especially if the period of commitment is short as in the feedback 
Nash  equilibrium  solution  where  the  period  of  commitment  is  zero.  The  open-loop  Nash 
equilibrium solution has an infinite period of commitment and is relevant when different factions 
in society cannot monitor each others’ resource stocks. With this solution the dynamic distortions 
arising  from  the  common  pool  problem  are  less  severe.  We  focus  on  the  open-loop  Nash 
equilibrium  solution  mainly  because  it  leads  to  a  more  tractable  analysis  with  closed-form 
analytical solutions. Furthermore, under this solution concept an economy with infinite seepage 
and no property rights turns out to be Pareto efficient and thus provides a useful benchmark. We 
thus focus at the inefficiencies caused by finite seepage rates and less than perfect property rights 
and  analyze  how  this  affects  the  rate  at  which  natural  resources  are  being  tapped  (and  thus 
abstract from the additional efficiencies that may result from smaller periods of commitment 
including the zero period of commitment assumed in the feedback Nash equilibrium solution). 
The  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium  solution  allows  one  to  analyze  how  the  Hartwick  rule  of 
reinvesting the Hotelling scarcity rents into various forms of productive capital is affected by 
moving from an assumption of common-pool open-access natural resources to an assumption of 
fields of natural resources owned by different groups but suffering from common-pool problems 
due to seepage of natural resources or imperfect property rights.  
Our analysis is also related to that of the voracity effect in societies with competing 
groups and lack of effective property rights. Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane 
(1999)  have  demonstrated  within  the  context  of  a  dynamic  common-pool  problem  that  an 
increase in the raw return on the common asset above the return on private assets increases the 
extent of rent seeking, depresses saving and investment and thus curbs the rate of economic 
growth and makes a country worse off from a social perspective. The voracity effect thus arises 
from a dynamic common-pool problem, whereby each group tries to grab more of the common 
asset before the other groups do so. We analyze, in contrast, a dynamic interconnected-pool 
problem with common-pool properties by extending van der Ploeg (2010) who studies genuine 
saving and voracious depletion within the context of a common-pool model with a pure common   4 
exhaustible  natural  resource  and  no  property  rights  at  all  on  natural  resources.  The  main 
contribution of this paper is thus to analyze a dynamic interconnected-pool problem where each 
group owns its own stock of natural resources and where property rights on these resources are 
neither perfect nor completely absent. Instead, property rights become more secure as the country 
accumulates more productive capital. 
Our paper does not deal with asymmetries. We suppose that all factions are identical with 
the  same  initial  stocks  of  natural  resources,  the  same  level  of  productivity,  and  the  same 
population size. We also suppose that the seepage process is symmetric and thus abstract from the 
possibility that seepage may benefit some resource owners more than others. Finally, we suppose 
that there is no one ruler supported by an elite or selectorate which owns the resource, decides on 
its extraction and to whom the resource proceedings accrue. We focus on factions wrestling 
resource rents from each other, but not from the ruler. If there was a ruler, Caselli (2006) shows 
abstracting  from  Hotelling  features  of  resource  depletion  that  power  struggles  increase  the 
effective  discount  rate  of  the  governing  group  and  that  as  a  result  this  elite  makes  fewer 
investments in the long-run development of the economy. Interestingly, this goes against our 
result which suggests that rapacious depletion rates much lead to excessive investments. Such 
ruler-follower models and the importance of understanding how natural resources might impact 
the political survival of the ruler are also discussed in Caselli and Cunningham (2009). Most of 
the aforementioned asymmetries feature in the real world, but are not the focus of this paper. 
Instead, we focus at the Hotelling model of non-cooperative resource depletion and how this 
interacts with the important question of genuine saving and sustainable consumption.
4  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section  2  sets up  our  model of depletion of 
exhaustible natural resources by competing factions and private accumulation. Section 3 gives the 
optimality  conditions  for  the  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium  outcome  of  the  non -cooperative 
differential game. Section 4 shows how the maxi-min outcome for this game permits an outcome 
with constant levels of consumption and output and characterizes the results. Section 5 discusses 
the homogenous case without competing factions or, alternatively, the case with no seepage  and 
perfectly secure property rights on natural resources . This  results in the  familiar  apolitical 
Hotelling and Hartwick rules where all resource rents are reinvested. Section 6 discusses why in a 
fractionalized society, prices of  natural resources  increase too fast, deple tion occurs too fast, 
savings and output are too high, and consumption is too low , especially if the re are many 
                                                 
4 Asymmetric Stackelberg leader-follower models of natural resource depletion with a monopolistic leader 
(the OPEC) and a competitive fringe have been analyzed and lead to time consistency issues and some 
other intricate game-theroretic issues (Groot et al., 2003).   5 
competing factions and the quality of property rights is bad. Section 7 establishes that genuine 
saving  is  zero in societies  with  competing factions in society or imperfect property rights  if 
welfare-based accounting prices are used to evaluate the cost of resource depletion. Section 8 
discusses  the  negative  adjusted  net  saving  estimates  reported  by  the  World  Bank  for  many 
resource-rich economies and argues that even these may be too optimistic if market prices are 
used instead of accounting prices. Section 9 qualifies the results and concludes. 
 
2. Competing Factions, Resource Depletion and Capital Accumulation 
We set up a model of a closed economy where the national stock of exhaustible natural resources 
is owned by rival factions who invest in private capital and manage their own stock of natural 
resource in the face of imperfect property rights. There is no population growth. Each group 
combines use of its exhaustible resources together with capital (and possibly labor and other 
factor  inputs  in  fixed  supply)  to  produce  output  according  to  a  Cobb-Douglas  production 
function. To focus on the interactions between asset accumulation and depletion of exhaustible 
resources, we abstract from trade between the various groups in society. We also abstract from 
open economy considerations such as natural resource exports, imports of produced goods, and 
investment in foreign assets.
5  
There are  thus  N  rival  groups  who  struggle  for  power  over  the  control  of  natural 
resources.  The  depletion  of  the  stock  exhaustible  natural  resource  reserves  of  group  i  is 
represented by the following diffusion process:  
 
(1)         0 ( ), (0) ,   1,.., ,
N
i i j i i i
ji
S R S S S S i N 

        
where  Ri  and  Si  denote,  respectively,  the  depletion  rate  and  the  stock  of  remaining  natural 
resource  reserves  of  group  i.  Dasgupta  (2001a,  p.  287)  has  used  such  diffusion  process  for 
interconnected fields or aquifers before.
6 The parameter    0 indicates the speed of seepage 
between the various oil or gas fields or the various linked water aquifers owned by the different 
                                                 
5 Within the context of a two-sector general equilibrium model of a small open economy, opening up to 
trade induces instantaneous gains from trade but these are eroded by ongoing natural resource depletion and 
the steady-state level of utility is lower than under autarky (Brander and Taylor, 1997). Within the context 
of a two-good, two-country world with national open-access renewable resources, natural resource 
importers gain from trade while a diversified natural resource exporter suffers a decline in steady-state 
utility despite some initial gains from trade (Brander and Taylor, 1998). The welfare consequences of 
opening up to free trade may thus well be negative. 
6 The main difference is that Dasgupta (2001a) solves a partial equilibrium problem, whereas we perform a 
macroeconomic general equilibrium analysis. Furthermore, he characterizes the first-order optimality 
conditions whereas we offer a full solution.   6 
groups. If  = 0, there is no seepage and the fields of natural resources are physically completely 
separate. In that case, there are no elements of a common-pool problem. This may be realistic for 
exhaustible gold, silver, diamond and iron deposits, but not for oil, gas or water deposits. In 
practice, if neighbors have lower stock of reserves, then oil, gas or water will seep away to the 
neighbors’ fields or aquifers. Hence, with seepage, reserves of faction i increase (decrease) if its 
level of reserves is lower (bigger) than that of its neighbors. This means that reserves of group i 
increase  (decrease)  if  group  i  has  in  the  past  depleted  more  (less)  of  its  reserves  than  its 
neighbors.  Note  that  the  diffusion  process  (1)  is  symmetric,  which  permits  an  analytically 
convenient solution. In practice, seepage may be asymmetric so that it is physically possible that 
at least some resource owners will benefit at the expense of other resource owners. Such resource 
owners would have differing motives and incentives; we leave the analysis of the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium solution for situations with asymmetric seepage for another occasion.  
The political and institutional set-up of our model consists of two parts. First, there are a 
finite number of competing rival factions in the economy and there is no entry of new factions or 
exit of existing factions (no open access). Together with the assumption of a finite and strictly 
positive value of , this leads to a dynamic common-pool problem or, to be more precise, a 
problem of interconnected private pools. Second, endogeneity of property rights is introduced in a 
starkly reduced-form manner. We suppose that property rights improve as the economy moves 
along  its  development  path.  The  evidence  reviewed  in  IMF  (2005)  offers  support  for  this 
supposition. To capture this, we set   */K, where *  0 indicates the given initial degree of 
insecurity of property rights and K is the aggregate capital stock. This captures that quality of 
property rights improves as societies become more advanced and have bigger stocks of aggregate 
capital. The parameter  thus indicates the ease by which property rights on natural resources can 
be encroached.
7 As property rights improve along a development path, the extent of  common-
pool or interconnected-pools externalities diminish.
8  
Integration of (1) shows that the time path of exhaustible resource depletion must satisfy: 
 
(1)         0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) d , 1,... i j i i
ji
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    
                                                 
7 With very strong property rights it may be possible to claim back the value of what has seeped through to 
neighbours, but this is unlikely to stand up in the courts. Hence, we exclude this possibility. 
8 If property rights would not improve as the capital stock grows, resour ce extraction would be even more 
rapacious and it is not feasible to sustain a constant level of consumption.   7 
where t denotes time and Si0 the initial stock of natural resource reserves owned by group i. Note 
























   and  0 0 ( ) , R t dt S

  where  R  stands  for  aggregate  resource 
depletion and S for the aggregate stock of remaining natural resource reserves. 
Each group i also accumulates assets Ki. Since we abstract from adjustment costs, taxes, 
etc., the relative price of financial assets is unity and their value exactly equals the capital stock. 
The capital stock of each group can be viewed as physical capital or human capital. Each group i 
employs capital, natural resources Ri and labor Li to produce output Yi. The production function 
for each group Yi = F(Ki,  Li, Ri) satisfies the Inada conditions and  constant returns to scale. 
Natural resources are necessary for production, so F(Ki, Li, 0) = 0. Natural resources are also 
inessential for production if there is a feasible program along which consumption is bounded 
away from zero. This might avoid that feasible consumption vanishes as natural resources run 
out.  If  there  are  sufficient  substitution  possibilities  between  resources  and  capital  or  labor, 
positive  levels  of  output  can  be  generated  by  switching  from  resource-intensive  to  capital-
intensive modes of production. With a CES production function and an elasticity of substitution 
greater  than  unity,  F(Ki,  Li,  0)  >  0  holds  and  thus  natural  resources  are  not  necessary  for 
production. Since exhaustibility of natural resources does not pose a problem, they are trivially 
inessential if the elasticity of substitution between factors of production exceeds unity. If the 
elasticity  of  substitution  is  less  than  unity,  capital  accumulation  cannot  compensate  for  the 
inevitable decline in the use of natural resources. Output and consumption must thus decline to 
zero. The economy is doomed, so that natural resources are essential for production. We therefore 
assume that each group has a Cobb-Douglas production function with a unit elasticity of factor 
substitution and a share of capital in value added greater than that of natural resources, i.e., 
1 , 0, 1 i i i i Y K R L
       
      . Natural resources are thus necessary, but not essential for 
production.
9 We abstract from depreciation of capital.  Each group supplies inelastically 1/N of 
labor, so that aggregate labor supply is normalized to one. If consumption by group i is denoted 
by Ci, the evolution of private wealth of group i is given by: 
 
(2)               
1 ,   where     and  1/ . i i i i i i i i K Y C Y K R L L N
          
   8 
We abstract from extraction costs for natural resources. We derive a Nash equilibrium solution; 
so that each rival group  i when deciding on its  optimal depletion level  Ri supposes that the 
depletion levels of the other factions ,, j R j i   remain constant. If  indicates the pure rate of 
time preference employed by each group and i   u(Ci)/Ci u(Ci)   0 denotes the elasticity of 
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    
          
 
subject to the evolution of its natural resource stock (1), the evolution of its capital stock (2) and 
the Nash conjecture that the depletion rates by the other groups in society, Rj , j  i, do not change 
when deciding on the optimal level of Ri.  
 
3. Optimality Conditions for the Dynamic Common-Pool Problem 
We derive for this non-cooperative differential game an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution.
10 
The resulting solu tion will be summarized in Proposition 1.  The Hamiltonian for group  i 
maximizing (3) subject to (1) and (2) is defined by 
 
(4)        
1
1
u( ) , i i i i i i i i j i
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where i and i denote the marginal utility for group i of an extra unit of capital and natural 
resources,  respectively.  Application  of  Pontryagin’s  maximum  principle  yields  the  following 
first-order conditions for each of the groups: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 If   < , capital does not add enough to production to compensate  for the declining use of natural 
resources and sustain a positive level of consumption. Resources are then essential for production. 
10 In the absence of property rights whatsoever (i.e.,  *), one has an open-access common exhaustible 
resource  whose  development  is  given  by 
0 1 , (0) .
N
i i S R S S
     The  open -loop  Nash  equilibrium 
outcome  then  yields  the  efficient  solution  which  also  prevails  in  a  homogenous  society  with out  rival 
factions.  The  feedback  Nash  equilibrium  yields  an  inefficient  solution  with  too  fast  extraction  of  the 
common exhaustible resource and sub-optimally low levels of consumption and high levels of saving and 
output (van der Ploeg, 2010). Our general equilibrium results are akin to earlier results on the efficiency of 
the open-loop solution for an open-access problem in partial equilibrium when demand for resources is iso-
elastic  (Reinganum  and  Stokey,  1985).  Note  that  the  Cobb -Douglas  production  function  in  our  general 
equilibrium analysis gives rise to a constant elasticity of demand for natural resources as well.   9 
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The following transversality conditions should also be satisfied: 
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Equation (5) implies that the marginal product of natural resources Yi/Ri should equal the price 
of natural resources, pi  i /i . Furthermore, the marginal product of capital Yi/Ki should equal 
the rate of return on capital for each group ri. Since in symmetric equilibrium the interest rates 
and natural resource prices are the same for each group, we drop group subscripts (i.e., r = ri and 
p = pi, i=1,…,N) and write these efficiency conditions as: 
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Equation (7) is the political variant of the Hotelling rule. If there is no fractionalization of society 
(i.e., N = 1) or property rights on natural resources are completely secure (* = 0), equation (7) 
reduces to the familiar Hotelling rule which states that the expected rate of increase in natural 
resources should equal the market rate of interest. This follows from the following arbitrage 
condition. On the margin, each group should be indifferent between keeping natural resources 
under the ground and receiving an expected capital gain / pp , and digging the resources up, 
selling them, and investing the proceeds and receiving a rate of return r. Rival groups in society, 
however, drive a wedge in the Hotelling rule. The reason is that each group consumes more 
today;  they  think  that  if  they  conserve  their  resources,  their  neighbor  will  consume  more 
tomorrow.
 11 This version of the Hotelling rule implies a bigger rate of increase in the price of 
natural resources than is socially optimal. This distortion appears to be smaller if the groups have 
accumulated a lot of non-resource wealth, but in the Nash equilibrium solution with constant 
                                                 
11 Since any group i takes the extraction rate of the other group j  i as given in the open-loop Nash 
equilibrium, group i does not expect that by delaying her own extraction she causes other groups to extract 
more of the resource. However, seepage implies that, if extraction is delayed, the stock of i will be higher 
than that of groups j  i and thus more of stock of i will seep to the fields of groups j  i.    10 
levels of consumption and output (derived in section 4) the rate of interest also falls as the capital 
stock rises over time. Equation (7) thus indicates that the rate of change of natural resource prices 
is inversely related to the capital stock. It exceeds the rate of interest in a fractionalized society, 
but over time this intertemporal wedge in the Hotelling rule asymptotically vanishes as society 
accumulates increasing amounts of capital and property rights improve. We also see from (7) that 
political distortions in the Hotelling rule causing too rapid extraction and too rapid increases in 
the price of resources are more severe if initial property rights are more insecure (higher *). 
First-order conditions (5) also imply the Keynes-Ramsey rule for growth in consumption: 
 







   
 
4. Sustaining Consumption in the Dynamic Common-Pool Problem 
A well-known problem with utilitarian Benthamite utility functions and positive discounting is 
that the optimal program implies a time path of consumption that first rises, then declines, and 
vanishes asymptotically or, alternatively, declines at the outset and vanishes asymptotically (e.g., 
Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, Chapter 10.3). There is thus at most one peak, which is further away in 
the future if the discount rate is smaller. An outcome where generations in the distant future 
consume almost nothing is hard to defend from an ethical and political point view. Hence, the 
literature often focuses attention at maxi-min egalitarian outcomes, where all future generations 
are treated equally and enjoy the same level of consumption. This is the approach we will adopt 
as well and we therefore assume zero elasticities of intertemporal substitution (i.e., i = 0), which 
correspond to a Rawlsian social welfare function.
12 
We  therefore  look  for  dynamic  general  equilibrium   paths  with  constant  levels  of 
consumption,  Ci(t)  =  C/N  >  0,  t    0  with  aggregate  consumption  C  >  0  a  constant  to  be 
determined.  To  obtain  a  Nash  equilibrium  solution  with  constant  levels  of  consumption  and 
output, we suppose a constant savings rate s and hypothesize the feasible program: 
 
(9)                                      Ki(t) = s Yi(t) t + Ki0 > 0, t  0, 
                                                 
12 An alternative is to rethink the axiomatic foundation of intertemporal preferences from an ethical point of 
view. One suggestion is the framework of sustainable discounted utilitarianism which imposes the 
requirement that the evaluation is insensitive to the interests of the present generation if the present is better 
off than the future generation (Asheim and Mitra, 2009). 
   11 
where for each group i we have that Ki(0) = Ki0 is the initial private stock of productive capital 
and the output level of each group Yi(t) > 0 is a positive constant. We will now verify that this 
hypothesized program (9) indeed satisfies the optimality conditions of the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium (5)-(6) as well as (1)-(2). Since investment is constant in such a program, output of 
each  faction Yi(t) =  sYi  (t)+  C/N  and  aggregate  output 
1 /(1 )
N
i i Y Y sY C C s
         are 
constant as well. Making use of the political Hotelling rule (7) and the production function in (2), 
we obtain 
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which gives the savings rate of each group as a diminishing function of aggregate output: 
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This is a political variant of the Hartwick rule, which says that a fractionalized economy with 
insecure property rights saves more than its natural resource rents. This wedge in the political 
Hartwick rule is bigger in societies with lower levels of output, worse property rights and a larger 
number  of  rival  factions. The  apolitical Hartwick  rule,  in  contrast, applies  to  a  homogenous 
society  or  one  with perfect  property  rights  and states  that  all  revenues from  natural resource 
should be reinvested, so that s = . We note from (10) and 
1/ / R Y K
     that 
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Integrating (12) and solving for the aggregate level of natural resource depletion yields 
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where the second identity follows from using the production function. The equilibrium solution 
must asymptotically deplete all natural resources, since any unused resources can be used to boost   12 
the  sustainable  level  of  consumption  of  any  group.  The  solution  must  thus  satisfy  (1)  with 
equality. Using the aggregate version of (12),  0 0 ( ) , R t dt S

  this implies that 
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Equation (13) yields the aggregate level of output and , using 
1/ /
0 (0) , R Y K
     also aggregate 
use of natural resources, both as increasing functions of the savings rate: 
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A higher initial stock of natural resources permits a higher level of output and thus necessitates a 
higher level of initial resource depletion. A higher stock of productive capital also permits more 
production, but requires a lower level of initial resource depletion. A higher savings rate boosts 
output and thus boosts initial resource use as well. 
The Nash equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving (11) and (14). Figure 1 uses 
the downward-sloping savings locus (11) denoted by SS and the upward-sloping output locus 
(14)  indicated  by  YY  together  with  the  initial  resource  use  locus  RR  defined  by 
1/ /
0 (0) R Y K
      to solve for the equilibrium savings rate, aggregate output and the initial rate 
of resource depletion. We see that a higher initial stock of capital or higher initial reserves of 
natural resources allows higher levels of production, for a given savings rate, and thus shifts out 
the output locus. As a result, the economy ends up with a higher level of output, a lower savings 
rate and a higher level of sustainable consumption. We see that a bigger initial stock of natural 
resources boosts the initial rate of resource depletion and lifts up the whole trajectory of resource 
depletion while a higher initial stock of productive capital can be shown to reduce the initial rate 
of  natural  resource  depletion. On  the  other  hand, more  competing  factions  in  society or less 
secure property rights on natural resources drive a wedge in the political Hartwick rule (11) and 
thus shift up the saving locus. It follows that society ends up with a higher savings rate and a 
higher level of output. Despite the higher output, a more fractionalized society or a society with 
less secure property rights sustains a lower level of consumption. It is also clear that the initial   13 
rate of natural resource depletion is higher, which is a consequence of the more rapid increase in 
natural resource prices and more rapacious resource depletion.  
 


















Key: More fractions or less secure property rights shift the savings locus from SS to SS, so the savings 
rate, output and initial resource use increase. A higher stock of initial natural resource reserves shifts the 
output locus YY to YY, so the savings rate falls while output and initial resource use increase. 
 
 
We now establish the properties of the Nash equilibrium solution more formally. 
 
Proposition 1: The open-loop Nash equilibrium solution is characterized by a constant savings 
rate and constant levels of sustainable consumption and output: 
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SS (higher N or higher *) 
SS 
YY     YY (higher S0) 
   14 
The transformation of exhaustible natural resources into productive capital to sustain constant 
levels of consumption and production requires a declining stock of natural resource reserves, 
 


















and a linearly increasing trajectory of the aggregate capital stock 
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where  *, sY N 
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denotes national savings. The declining path of natural resource use is: 
 
(18)   
1





                                   
 
 
Prices of natural resources p = Y/R increase forever; initially they increase at a faster pace than 
the market rate of interest, especially if * (N1) is large, but this wedge vanishes asymptotically:  
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The initial price of natural resources is given by: 
 
(20)           00 (0) P , , *, . p K S N 
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
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The rate of interest r = Y/K declines over time and vanishes asymptotically. The signs of the 
partial derivatives given in (15)-(20) indicate the comparative statics. 
 
Proof: By construction the solution (15)-(20) satisfies the depletion equations (1) and (1), the 
capital accumulation equations (2) and the first-order conditions (5): (15) follows from solving 
(11) and (14); (16) follows from integrating (18); (17) comes from substituting the solutions for s 
and Y into (9); (18) is derived from substituting the solution for R(0) into (12); (16) is obtained 
by integrating (18) using (1) and making use of (13) and 
1/ /
0 (0) R Y K
     ; (19) comes from 
substituting (15) and (17) into (7) and making use of (11); and (20) follows immediately from 
(1 )
0 0 0 (0) / (0) , , *, . p Y R K R K S N

 
       

  We  note  from  (17)  that  the  transversality 
condition (6) on the Ki, i=1,..,N is satisfied provided  = r* > 0. The transversality condition (6) 
on the resource stocks are also satisfied, since from (16) we see that S(t) vanishes as t. We 
have thus established that the hypothesized solution is an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution. 







              d d d + d[ *( 1)]
1 1 (1 )
*( 1)
d d d d[ *( 1)],
11
YY
Y K S N
K S s
N Y Y
s K S N
Y K S Y
   

   
    

   
         
                        
                                              
 
where
2 1 [ *( 1)]/[ (1 )] 1. N sY          For C=(1s)Y, sY and
1/ /
0 (0) R Y K





1 *( 1) d d ( )
          d ( ) d[ *( 1)]
1 (1 ) (1 )
*( 1) d d
           d ( ) d[ *( 1)]




s N K S s
CN
Y K S





   
    
 
   
    


       
                 
     
                  
 
     
00
00
d (0) d (0)
( 1) (0) + d[ *( 1)].
1 (1 )





   
         
                        
where we note from (11) that the first term in brackets on the right-hand side of the equation for 
d  vanishes.  Given  that    >  ,  the  signs  of  the  partial  derivatives  in  (15)-(20)  follow 
immediately from these expressions.                      
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We only have a meaningful solution with positive levels of aggregate consumption, output and 
saving/investment  while  natural  resource  reserves  decline  if  capital  is  more  important  in 
production than natural resources. If  < , output cannot be sustained at a constant level with a 
finite stock of natural resources even if all of output is saved. Consequently, private consumption 
eventually vanishes.
13 We thus assume  > . The levels of aggregate consumption and output 
that can be sustained are then larger if the initial stock of private assets and common stock of 
natural reserves are higher. The initial natural resource price is low if the initial stock of natural 
resource reserves is high and the initial capital stock is low. Over time, natural resource prices 
increase. This induces continuous factor substitution, so that gradually the capital stock grows 
and the use of natural resources declines. Furthermore, we see from (19) that both the initial 
natural resource price and its rate of increase are higher while initial resource depletion is also 
higher in a more fractionalized society.  
Armed with proposition 1, we can characterize the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome 
precisely. Before we discuss this in more detail, we briefly review the apolitical Hotelling and 
Hartwick rules and equilibrium outcomes that prevail in a society with no rival factions (i.e., with 
N=1). These are also the outcomes that prevail under a social planner (see Solow (1974)) or in a 
heterogeneous society with perfectly secure property rights (N > 1 and * = 0). 
  
5. Benchmark: Secure Property Rights or No Rival Factions 
Consider a homogenous society without any rival factions or a heterogeneous society with perfect 
property rights. In that case, either N = 1 or * = 0 and (11) and (14) imply that 
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The saving rate of a homogenous society thus equals the share of natural resources in value added 
. Hence, the value of depleted natural resources is fully saved and invested (i.e., pR = Y = sY). 
This is the celebrated Hartwick rule. Genuine saving is zero when there are no rival factions or 
property rights are perfect: 
 
                                                 
13 Natural resources are also essential if physical capital depreciates in a radioactive manner, but not if 
depreciation is linear or proportional to output.   17 
(22)     
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The Hartwick rule thus requires that the depletion of natural wealth is exactly compensated by 
accumulation  of  physical  capital,  hence  genuine  saving  is  zero.  By  transforming  exhaustible 
natural resources into productive capital, the country sustains constant levels of consumption, 
output and investment.
14 Investment in capital is positive and compensates exactly for the loss in 
natural wealth.
15 The value of natural resources extracted at each point of time  pR does not 
change over time, since the depletion level of resources falls at exactly the same rate as the price 
of resources appreciates. This rate is, of course, the market interest rate in a homogenous society, 
which declines over time and vanishes asymptotically (
..
// p p R R r    ). 
 
6. A Fractionalized Society with Insecure Property Rights 
A fractionalized society with insecure property rights saves more than the natural resource rents, 
so the saving rate exceeds . The savings rate is high if there are many rival factions and less 
secure property rights. The upward bias in the savings rate is less if aggregate output is high or, 
alternatively, if the initial stocks of natural resource reserves and productive capital are high. The 
constant  level  of  output  is  higher  in  more  fractionalized  societies  with  less  secure  property 
rights.
16 Nevertheless, due to the higher savings rate, consumption is less with rival factions and 
imperfect property rights. The inefficient allocation in this economy arises from the lack of  fully 
effective property rights for natural resources.  It can thus be seen from equations (1 6) and (18) 
that in a fractionalized society with insecure property rights  each group thus  extracts natural 
resources at a too fast a pace,  
 
                                                 
14 In a competitive market economy without externalities constant genuine saving corresponds to constant 
instantaneous utility and thus constant consumption (Dixit et al. 1980). More generally, Hamilton and 
Withagen (2007) demonstrate that prescribing genuine saving as a constant positive fraction of output 
yields a path with unbounded consumption and higher wealth than the  standard Hartwick rule of zero 
genuine saving and constant consumption. 
15 Capital grows ad infinitum while the interest rate and the depletion rate decline to zero. If positive total 
factor productivity growth is introduced, there may be a steady state with a positive interest rate and a 
positive depletion rate as discussed in Dasgupta and Heal (1974).  
16 It may seem odd that theory predicts that output is higher in fractionalized resource-rich societies with 
insecure property rights, because many of those economies have bad economic performance and are poor. 
However, those economies often also suffer from bad institutions, macroeconomic mismanagement, and 
high volatility of export commodity prices which tend to worsen economic performance (Poelhekke and 
van der Ploeg, 2009).   18 
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and hence saves and invests too much and consumes too little. Rapacious rent seeking thus hurts 
consumption by the members of each group and harms social welfare.  
  Since  our  use  of  the  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  implies  that  the  demand  for 
natural resources (i.e., R(t) =  Y/p(t)) is iso-elastic, natural resource revenues p R =  Y stay 
constant all the time and are higher if the number of rival factions is higher. The interest rate is 
initially higher and then falls more rapidly in a fractionalized society. As a result, natural resource 
wealth defined as the present value of current and future resource rents is given by: 
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provided that  > s. Natural resource wealth is higher if the number of rival factions is higher and 
property rights are less secure (as then s is higher). Note that the value of selling all reserves at 
once  (i.e.,  p(0)S0)  falls  short  of  the  present  value  of  current  and  future  oil  revenues  in 
fractionalized  societies  with  imperfect  property  rights,  since  using 
1
0 (0) / (0) (0) p Y R K R
 
   and substituting R(0) from (14) and then comparing with (24) 
we obtain 
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We thus see that in homogenous societies or in fractionalized societies with perfect property 
rights, the market value of the initial stock of natural resource reserves exactly equals the present 
value  of  current  and  future  resource  revenues  (as  then  s  =    and  (25)  holds  with  equality). 
However,  if  there  are  competing  factions  and  property  rights  on  natural  resources  are  badly 
defined, the savings rate is higher than predicted by the Hartwick rule (s > ) and depletion of 
natural resources is rapacious as indicated by (23). This too rapid selling off of natural resource 
reserves is triggered by the value of resource reserves in the ground being less than the present 
discounted value of all current and future resource revenues.    19 
Total wealth consists of financial capital, human wealth (i.e., the net present value of the 
return on the fixed factor)
17 and natural resource wealth. Human wealth is proportional to natural 
resource wealth and equals  0 (1 ) /( ). Ks        Total initial wealth can thus be written as 
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It  thus  follows  that  resource  wealth,  human  wealth,  and  total  wealth  are  all  higher  in  a 
fractionalized society with insecure property rights (and thus a too high value of  s from a social 
optimum perspective). Hence, the present discounted value of the stream of current and future 
sustainable consumption which exactly equals total initial wealth must be lower in such a society 
as  well.  Interestingly,  (26)  and  proposition  (1)  indicate  that  fractionalization  and  less  secure 
property rights boosts the savings rate and thus boost total initial wealth. Still, we know from (15) 
that  consumption  decreases  if  there  are  more  rival  factions  and  property  rights  become  less 
secure. The reason is that the propensity to consume out of initial total wealth, 
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is lower in a fractionalized society with insecure property rights.
18  In fact, this more than offsets 
the higher total initial wealth. Hence, consumption is lower despite higher initial total wealth. The 
intuition is as follows. Even though the interest rate is initially higher, it falls more rapidly in a 
fractionalized society and eventually becomes less than in a homogenous society. Consequently, 
the present value of the lower level of the stream of constant consumption levels is higher despite 
the lower level of sustainable consumption .  Finally, despite natural resource reserves being 
depleted all the time, natural resource wealth, human wealth, financial wealth and thus total 
wealth increase throughout as the capital stock rises and the interest rate falls as time proceeds. 
 
                                                 
17 Human wealth can also be interpreted as the value of land, i.e, the present discounted value of land rents. 
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as s >  > . Since s is higher in a 
fractionalize society with insecurity property rights, it follows that  must be lower in such a society.   20 
7. Genuine Saving in Resource-Rich Economies with Market Failures 
The economy with competing factions has an imperfect mechanism for resource allocation and 
thus yields an inefficient allocation with too rapid extraction and too low levels of consumption 
from a social point of view. One can then apply the theoretical framework for national accounting 
in economies with imperfect allocation mechanisms developed by Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), 
Dasgupta (2001b) and Arrow, Dasgupta and Mäler (2003) to our economy. They show that the 
sign of the genuine saving indicator in a model with two capital goods (not unlike the present 
model)  depends  on  the  accounting  price  of  the  natural  resource  in  terms  of  capital.  This 
accounting price equals the relative effect of a marginal increase in the initial stock of natural 
resources on the social objective function divided by the relative effect of a marginal increase in 
the initial capital stock on the social objective function.  
In our model all groups in society have a Rawlsian maxi-min objective function. Since 
we know that the intertemporal preferences of all groups are aligned, the social objective function 
will  be  maxi-min  as  well.  Equation  (15)  gives  an  expression  for  sustainable  consumption 
C(K0,S0,*,N), which indicates social welfare. Since only the relative price matters, the numeraire 
for the social welfare indicator does not matter. The appropriately corrected accounting price of 
natural resources, pG(0), to be used in calculating genuine saving is thus given by 
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where  the  partial  derivatives  in  the  proof  of  proposition  1   have  been  used  to  derive  (27). 
Following  Arrow,  Dasgupta  and  Mäler  (2003),  we  define  the  genuine  savings  ratio  as 
(0) [ (0) (0) (0)]/ (0) GG s K p S Y   and prove that it is zero. 
 
Proposition 2: Genuine saving is zero in fractionalized societies with insecure property rights. 
Proof: We use (1) and (11) and then substitute (27) to write 
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Substituting  0 (0) (0) Y K R
  and R(0) from (14), we obtain sG(0) = 0.          
   21 
It is interesting to note that, if the welfare-based accounting price is used to value the stock of 
natural resource reserves, the value of reserves under the ground thus calculated exactly equals 
the present discounted value of current and future natural resource revenues, 
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whereas (25) indicates that the market values of reserves falls short of that. We also note that the 
accounting price pG(0) as function of the relative stock of physical capital to natural resources for 
a fractionalized society with insecure property rights is exactly the same as the market price of 
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and equals (27) only if N = 1, * = 0 and thus s =  from (11). 
This reflects that the trajectory of physical capital and natural resource in (K,S)-space are exactly 
the same in the homogenous and fractionalized societies. This is why genuine saving is zero and 
not  negative  and  why  development  in  this  economy  with  competing  factions  and  insecure 
property rights on natural resources is sustainable. The problem from a social perspective is that 
movement  along  this  trajectory  is  too  fast  in  a  fractionalized  society,  thus  leading  to  an 
inefficiently low constant level of sustainable consumption. Hence, both the rate of depletion of 
natural resources and the rate of investment occur are too high and are the same, so that genuine 
saving will be zero while the level of sustainable consumption is too low.
19 
The World Bank (2006) calculates, however, its empirical estimate of ‘genuine saving’ 
with the actual market price, hence it is now more appropriately called ‘adjusted net saving’. 
Arrow,  Dasgupta  and  Mäler  (2003)  stress  that  relying  on  market  observables  to  infer  social 
welfare can be misleading in imperfect economies. Expression (25) implies that, if the World 
Bank uses the market price p(0) with N > 1 and * > 0 instead of the welfare-based accounting 
price pG(0) (i.e., p(0) with N = 1 or * = 0), it would use too low prices as the accounting price 
pG(0) that should be used for calculating genuine saving is higher than the market price p(0), 
especially if there are many competing factions and property rights are more insecure.
20 Hence, 
                                                 
19 This result is independent of the particular parameterization linking property rights to the capital stock, 
since the result of zero genuine saving is also obtained in a model where rival groups are tapping a common 
natural resource with no property rights at all (van der Ploeg, 2010). 
20 With  = 0.4,  = 0.1 (0.3) and N = 5, the accounting price should be a half (quarter) of the market price.   22 
the World Bank estimates of adjusted net saving would in our framework show up as positive for 
a fractionalized society with imperfect property rights: 
 
(22)   
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Since Proposition 2 states that the welfare-based measure of genuine saving should be zero, our 
theory  suggests  that the  World  Bank  estimates  of  adjusted  net  saving  over-estimate  genuine 
saving for countries with many rival factions and insecure property rights.  
 
 
8. Puzzle: Biases in Empirical Measures of Genuine Saving 
Our game-theoretic analysis has captured some inefficiencies resulting from squabbling about 
natural resources in economies with fractionalization, insecure property rights and high risks of 
expropriation.
21 To get a better  grasp of our results, consider the  adjusted net saving figures 
reported by Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), Hamilton, Ruta and Tajibaeva (2005) and the World 
Bank (2006).
22 These measures are increasingly used in empirical work on the natural resource 
curse (e.g., Ding and Field, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008;  Alexeev and Conrad, 2009), 
so it is important to understand what these figures refer to. Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) show that 
under  a  social planner,  genuine saving  equals  the increase in wealth of the nation and  that 
realizing  the  constant  maxi -min  level  of  consumption  demands  zero  genuine  saving.
23 
24 
Proposition 2 shows that zero genuine saving al so results  in fractionalized economies with 
insecure property rights provided the welfare-based accounting prices are used. Any depletion of 
natural resources or damage done by stock pollutants must thus be compensated for by increases 
in non-human and/or  human capital.  However,  equation (22)  suggests  that,  if  societies  are 
                                                 
21 Resource-rich countries have indeed poor growth performance after controlling for quality of institutions, 
openness, the investment rate and initial income per capita (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2000). 
22 Adjusted net saving is calculated as public and private saving at home and abroad, net of depreciation, 
plus current spending on education to capture changes in intangible human capital  minus depletion of 
natural exhaustible and renewable resources minus damage of stock pollutants (CO2 and particulate matter). 
23 In fact, Dasgupta (2001a) shows that wealth per capi ta is the correct measure of social welfare if the 
population growth rate is constant, per capita consumption is independent of population size, production 
has constant returns to scale, and current saving is the present value of future changes in consumption. 
24 The Hartwick rule is related to Hicksian real income. Asheim and Weitzman (2001) and Sefton and 
Weale (2006) show that the rule ensures no change in the present discounted value of current and future 
utility and requires use of the Divisia index of  real consumption prices. Capital gains represent the 
capitalization of the future changes in factor prices and thus constitute a transfer from one factor to another. 
In the closed economy net gains are zero and should not be included in real income.   23 
fractionalized with badly defined property rights as is the case for many resource-rich countries, 
the World  Bank  estimates  of  adjusted net  saving  using  market  rather  than accounting  prices 
should yield positive figures even though the corresponding welfare-based estimates of genuine 
saving will be zero. 
Looking at the latest available estimates of adjusted net savings calculated by the World 
Bank,  namely  for  the  year  2006,  restricting  attention  to  natural  resources  that  are  prone  to 
seepage, namely oil and gas, and leaving out other resources which are not prone to seepage 
(minerals,  coal,  forestry,  etc.),  the  scatter  diagram  and  estimated  regression  line  in  figure  2 
indicate that countries with a large percentage of oil and gas rents of GNI typically have negative 
adjusted net saving rates.
25 Many countries thus become poorer each year despite have abundant 
natural resources. They  squander their natural resource wealth without investing sufficiently in 
other forms of intangible or productive wealth. This may explain why oil-rich Venezuela enjoyed 
negative economic growth while Botswana, Ghana and China with positive  adjusted net saving 
rates  benefit from  substantial growth. Highly resource -dependent Nigeria and Angola have 
adjusted net saving rates of minus 30 percent, thus impoverishing future generations. The oil/gas 
states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation also have 
negative adjusted net saving rates. Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon might have been 
as wealthy as South Korea if they would have reinvested their resource rents. All these countries 
(except Trinidad and Tobago) have suffered declines in per capita income from 1970 to 2000. 
Our theory suggests that true figures of genuine saving are likely to be more negative in 
fractionalized societies with poor property rights. Indeed, figure 3 suggests that countries with a 
share of oil & gas rents greater than 20 percent have more negative adjusted net saving rates if 
they have a high degree of ethnic fractionalization. Internal conflict and high levels of corruption 
are also associated with negative adjusted net saving rates in resource-rich countries. Our theory 
also  suggests  that  investment  rates  are  higher  in  resource -rich  economies  that  are  more 
fractionalized and have less secure property rights, and the weak correlation reported in figure 4 
is not inconsistent with this hypothesis. Much of this investment may not only be excessive but 
also of bad quality. For example, politicians may have incentives to invest too much in partisan 
poor-quality  projects  (‘white  elephants’)  to  prevent  potential  rivals  spending  the  resource 
revenues once they get booted out of office (e.g., Robinson and Torvik, 2005; Collier, et al., 
2010).  
                                                 
25 The stylized facts look qualitatively the same when we use 2003 data or when we include a broader 
measure of natural resources consisting of bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, zinc, phosphates, silver, gold, 
brown coal, hard coal, tin, and nickel as well.    24 










































0 50 100 150 200
Oil & Gas Rents % GNI, 2006
Fitted values
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 



















































Source: International Country Risk Guide and World Bank Development Indicators 
 

























































Source: International Country Risk Guide and World Bank Development Indicators   25 
The negative adjusted net saving rates reported by the World Bank for resource-rich 
countries are cause for concern, especially as the true figures are even more negative once we 
allow countries having group rivalry and insecure property rights. In the real world, rapacious 
resource depletion may go hand in hand with excessive reinvestment of resource rents, possibly 
of a poor quality. Many of the poorest resource-rich countries can thus not sustain consumption, 
especially if they also need to save to fight off high population growth rates and declining wealth 
per capita (e.g., World Bank 2006, Table 5.2). Such countries need positive rather than zero 
genuine saving to maintain constant consumption per head, since they are on a treadmill and need 
to save more than their resource rents. Unfortunately, adjusted net saving World Bank estimates 
suggest that they rarely manage that. 
Although  our  theory  explains rapacious  resource  depletion, excessive  investment  and 
poor economic performance, it does not explain the stylized fact of negative genuine saving. One 
possibility is that countries save less than their natural resource rents and postpone extraction if 
they anticipate future world prices of resources to rise as discussed in Asheim (1986, 1996) and 
Vincent,  Panayotou  and  Hartwick  (1997).  But  Hamilton  and  Bolt  (2004)  show  that  the 
adjustments to allow for changes in future resource prices are small if historical price trends are 
extrapolated. If resource-rich countries expect the future cost of natural resource extraction
26 or 
future government spending to fall, it is also optimal to have negative genuine saving rates.  An 
alternative explanation is that fighting about natural resources induces corruption and erosion of 
the  legal system. This  discourages saving and investment   in productive capital as in Hodler 
(2006). Infighting about natural resources is further exacerbated by shortsighted politicians.  
 
9. Conclusion 
What happens to national saving and investment if legal systems function badly and rival groups 
deplete  exhaustible  natural  resources  with  imperfectly  defined  property  rights?  With  perfect 
property rights, the country would transform its exhaustible resources into productive capital by 
reinvesting all resource rents (the Hartwick rule) and thus sustain constant levels of consumption 
and output. The rate of appreciation of the price of natural resources would equal the interest rate 
(the Hotelling rule), which gradually decreases over time as the capital stock grows. Resources 
are depleted steadily, but natural resource wealth increases throughout nevertheless. Matters are 
                                                 
26 US historical experience suggests that under the right circumstances anticipated falls in extraction costs 
and thus the downward effect on the nation’s saving is substantial. US supremacy as mineral producer was 
driven  by  big  falls  in  exploration  costs  from  the  mid-nineteenth  to  mid-twentieth  century,  collective 
learning, leading education in mining/engineering/metallurgy, increasing returns, private initiative and an 
accommodating legal environment; see Habbakuk (1962) and David and Wright (1997).    26 
very different in a fractionalized society with insecure property rights. Although the country still 
manages to sustain constant levels of consumption and output, these levels are sub-optimally low.  
Imperfect property rights induce common-pool externalities, which drive the rate of appreciation 
of the price of natural resources at a too high a pace. The rapacious depletion that ensues is driven 
by the value of resource reserves in the ground being less than the present discounted value of 
current and future resource revenues. Substitution of natural resources for productive capital thus 
occurs too fast, the saving and investment rates are too high, and extraction of natural resources 
too rapid compared with the social optimum. Despite resource wealth, human wealth and total 
wealth  being  higher,  sustainable  consumption  is  lower.  The  reason  is  that  the  propensity  to 
consume out of total wealth is sufficiently lower to offset the higher total wealth. People really 
are worse off in terms of having to make to do with a lower level of sustainable consumption, 
especially in countries with a large degree of fractionalization and poor legal systems.  
Our  theory  predicts  zero  genuine  saving  rates  even  in  fractionalized  societies  with 
imperfect property rights. The reason is that both the rate of depletion of natural resources and the 
rate of investment in productive capital occur too fast and at the same rate, thus genuine saving is 
zero yet the level of sustainable consumption is lower. Adjusted net saving indicators for many 
resource-rich countries as calculated by the World Bank are actually negative, and the true figures 
will be even more negative as true accounting prices (i.e., the market prices that would prevail in 
a society with perfect property rights) rather than the lower market prices should be used when 
calculating genuine saving. This is a real worry, especially for countries which should be saving 
more than their resource rents to cope with high population growth rates.  
The challenge for future research is thus to offer political economy explanations of why 
genuine saving rates in many resource-rich economies are negative even though erosion of the 
legal system and the resulting infighting about natural resources boosts the saving and investment 
rate while leaving genuine saving unaffected. In practice, however, natural resource revenues 
may  be  siphoned  off  by  the  political  elite  and  their  cronies  and  thus  not  reach  the  people. 
Furthermore, natural resource bonanzas may induce exuberant, unsustainable public spending, 
based  on  the  erroneous  premise  that  windfall  natural  resource  revenues  are  permanent,  and 
painful adjustments when the windfall ceases. Also, property rights may depend not only on the 
aggregate capital stock, but also on whether the capital stock of one group is bigger than that of 
rival groups which may enable the group to better protect its natural resources but also may make 
rival groups more apt to steal their resources. Fighting and weapon investments by the various 
groups  would  then  depend  positively  on  the  size  of  natural  resources  to  be  captured  and 
negatively  on  the  opportunity  cost  of  labor  when  it  is  not  fighting.  Wasteful  fighting  and   27 
investment in weapons may well lead to negative genuine saving rates. Finally, politicians seek 
office and grab resource rents for themselves or to pay off political opponents and get away with 
it due to poor institutions, bad legal systems and poor checks and balances in the political system. 
Rapacious rent seeking implies that many resource-rich, fractionalized countries with poor legal 
systems squander their natural resource rents and suffer disastrous economic and social outcomes. 
It may even be that the extra rents that are not captured are not fully saved and invested, thus 
leading to negative genuine saving and impoverishment of the country. 
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